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THE EXCLUSIVE ADMIRALTY JURISDICTION
W. T. BEEKS AND GORDON W. MOSS*
N Cline v. Price' the owners of a minority interest in a fishing vessel,
being dissatisfied with the use to which it was being put, brought
suit in Superior Court against the majority owners. The action prayed
the appointment of a receiver, an accounting, and a partition of the
vessel by sale and distribution of the proceeds. A demurrer was sus-
tained by the lower court and affirmed by the Supreme Court. The
ground assigned was that the suit, essentially one for partition, was
exclusively within the admiralty jurisdiction of the United States, and
the state courts have no jurisdiction to afford such relief.
This pitfall of exclusive admiralty jurisdiction is one which the
practitioner in our maritime state of Washington may often have occa-
sion to meet. It shall be the purpose of this article to discuss some of
the fundamental aspects of the admiralty jurisdiction in general, with
particular emphasis upon those classes of cases where the suitor is
limited in his choice of forum to the federal courts sitting in admiralty.
SOURCE OF ADMIRALTY JURISDICTION
The fountainhead of the jurisdiction is, of course, the Constitution of
the United States. Article III, § 2, provides: "The judicial power shall
extend . . . to all cases of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction." In
the Judiciary Act of 1789, Congress granted exclusive original juris-
diction in all civil causes of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction to the
United States District Courts. That grant was coupled with a reserva-
tion to the common law courts, however, for the Act further provided'
4... saving suitors, in all cases, the right of a common law remedy,
where the common law is competent to give it." By this saving clause,
the state courts (and federal courts on the common law side) were
left free to enforce in their customary manner such maritime rights and
liabilities as they had in the past. The scope of this clause will be dis-
cussed in detail later in this article.
What were cases of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction was left to
the courts to decide; but by the time of the framing of the Constitu-
tion, the maritime law, which is of ancient origin, with considerable
* Members of the Washington Bar.
139 Wn. 2d 816, 239 P. 2d 322 (1951).
2 Section 9, 1 STAT. 76 (1789), 28 U.S.C. § 371 (1946).
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uniformity was adopted and enforced by the maritime nations of the
world including the American colonies.8 In 1759 Lord Mansfield was
able to say: "The maritime law is not the law of a particular country,
but the general law of nations."' But this does not mean that by the
grant of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction to the federal courts there
was conveyed to them a system of ready-made rules complete in every
respect. As stated by Mr. Justice Bradley in The Lottawanna:5
But it is hardly necessary to argue that the maritime law is only so far
operative as law in any country as it is adopted by the laws and usages of
that country. ... But the actual maritime law can hardly be said to have a
fixed and definite form as to all the subjects which may be embraced within
its scope. Whilst it is true that the great mass of maritime law is the same in
all commercial countries, yet, in each country, peculiarities exist either as to
some of the rules, or in the mode of enforcing them.
The problem of charting the precise boundaries of the admiralty juris-
diction to meet the requirements peculiar to this country largely occu-
pied the Supreme Court in its opinions on the subject during the last
century.
CONTRACT JURISDICTION IN ADIRALTY
Before the litigant has a problem of choice of forum, as between a
state court and a federal court sitting in admiralty, his case must be
within the admiralty and maritime jurisdiction of the United States.
As to contracts, the test of that jurisdiction is subject matter. If the
nature of the contract is what the courts will label maritime, the con-
tract is within the admiralty jurisdiction, regardless of where the
contract was made or to be executed. In this latter respect the Ameri-
can admiralty jursidiction was expanded from that of England at the
time of our Constitution. The English admiralty courts had had their
jurisdiction severely limited by the jealousy of Lord Coke and the
common law courts, and with but few exceptions a contract had to be
3 The Colony of Rhode Island had adopted the Laws of Oleron as its code on ad-
miralty matters as early as 1647. The Virginia Colony had enacted that its courts of
admiralty should be governed by the "laws of Oleron and the Rhodian and Imperial
laws, so far as they have been heretofore observed in the English courts of admiralty
and by the laws of nature and of nations." See Canfield, The Uniformity of the Mari-
time Law, 24 MicH. L. REv. 544, 556 (1926).
4 Luke v. Lyde, 2 Burr. 887 (1759). See also Mr. Justice Bradley's statement in
The Lottawanna, 88 U.S. 558, 22 L. Ed. 654 at 662 (1875): "That we have a maritime
law of our own, operative throughout the United States, cannot be doubted. The gen-
eral system of maritime law which was familiar to the lawyers and statesmen of the
country when the Constitution was adopted, was most certainly intended and referred
to when it was declared in that instrument that the judicial power of the United States
shall extend 'to all cases of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction.'"
5 88 U.S. 558, 22 L. Ed. 654, 661 (1875).
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made and executed on the seas to be enforcible in an English court of
admiralty.6 The test for this country was laid down in Insurance Co.
v. Dunham7 where the court said: "As to contracts... the true criterion
is the nature and subject matter of the contract, as whether it was a
maritime contract having reference to maritime service or maritime
transactions." A discussion of the various kinds of contracts which, in
a substantive sense, are in their nature maritime, is beyond the scope
of this article. Mr. Justice Story, in DeLovio v. Boit,8 stated that the
contract jurisdiction "extends over all contracts . . . which relate to
the navigation, business or commerce of the sea." Perhaps the best
omnibus definition in accord with the decided cases is that found in
Benedict's celebrated work on admiralty:'
A contract relating to a ship in its use as such or to commerce on navigable
waters is subject to the maritime law and the case is one of admiralty and
maritime jurisdiction, whether the contract is to be performed on land or
water.
To the general rule of subject matter as the determining test is one
exception of which the practitioner must beware: a contract to build
a ship is "non-maritime" and not within the admiralty jurisdiction. It
was so decided by the Supreme Court in 1857; " and despite frequent
attack (resulting in the drawing of fine lines of distinction between
new construction and reconstruction or repair") this anomaly has
been firmly imbedded in our law ever since. The builder is thus de-
prived of that useful weapon, a maritime lien upon the ship, with its
concomitant priority over common law and state-created statutory
liens.'
TORT JURISDICTION IN ADMIRALTY
In admiralty tort jurisdiction the key word is not subject matter but
locality. Jurisdiction depends on whether the tort occurs on navigable
6 See the discussion by Story, J. in DeLovio v. Boit, 2 Gall. 398, 472 (U.S.C.C.,
1815) ; Waring v. Clarke, 46 U.S. 441, 12 L. Ed. 226 (1847).
7 78 U.S. 1, 20 L. Ed. 90 (1870), upholding the admiralty jurisdiction over a con-
tract of marine insurance, though it was made and to be performed (by payment)
on land.
s Supra, note 6.
9 1 BENEDICT, ADMIRALTY 130 (6th ed. 1940).
10 People's Ferry Co. v. Beers, 61 U.S. 393, 15 L. Ed. 961 (1857). The case
applied the English test of locality, and found the contract wanting because made and
to be performed on land. The case represented a triumph of the states' rights philoso-
phy in narrowing the federal jurisdiction and authority.
"1 New Bedford Dry Dock Co. v. Purdy, 258 U.S. 96, 66 L. Ed. 482 (1922).
12 The Hendrick Hudson, Fed. Cas. No. 6358 (D.C. N.Y., 1855); The Guiding
Star, 18 F. 263 (C.C. Ohio, 1883).
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waters of the Uited States or on the high seas; thus admiralty juris-
diction over torts differs in essential principle from its jurisdiction over
contracts. The test of tort jurisdiction stems from Mr. Justice Story's
statement in DeLovio v. Boit5 that cases of admiralty and maritime
jurisdiction, within the constitutional delegation, comprehend "all
maritime contracts, torts, and injuries. The latter branch is necessarily
bounded by locality." The locality test was solidified and adopted as
the ratio decidendi by the Supreme Court in The Plymouth," denying
admiralty jurisdiction to the owners of a wharf damaged by fire origi-
nating from a ship and caused by the negligence of those in charge of
her. The court said: "The whole, or at least the substantial cause of
action arising out of the wrong, must be complete within the locality
upon which the jurisdiction depends.., on the high seas or navigable
waters." This restriction of tort jurisdiction to locality regardless of the
maritime flavor of the tort, resulted in the anomalous situation that if
a vessel struck a bridge or wharf, the damage to the vessel was within
admiralty jurisdiction but the damage to the bridge or wharf was not.
It also created difficulties in connection with injuries caused by ships
to amphibious objects such as beacons attached to the land by means of
piles driven into the harbor bottom. In The Blackheath,5 Mr. Justice
Holmes, commenting that the scope of admiralty jurisdiction is not a
matter of "obvious principle or very accurate history" extended it to
an injury by a vessel to a beacon resting on piles. The key distinction
was that the beacon was a government aid to navigation. The decision
was followed in The Raithmoor,8 but not extended, so as to reverse
The Plymouth, to injuries to docks, bridges, protection piling or similar
"land" structures."
These fine rules and distinctions became troublesome when in 1942
the United States suddenly became a large shipowner and operator,"
because existing Congressional permission to sue the government on its
shipping contracts and torts was limited to suits brought in admiralty
Is Supra, note 6.
"4 70 U.S. 20, 18 L. Ed. 125 (1865).
'5 195 U.S. 361, 49 L. Ed. 236 (1904).
16241 U.S. 166, 60 L. Ed. 937 (1915). The court said that the beacon's "locality
and design gave it a distinctively maritime relation," seemingly superadding a subject-
matter criterion to the test of locality. Query how the "maritime relation" of a beacon
on piles differs from that of a wharf similarly supported, in a matter so substantive
as jurisdiction.
17 Cleveland T. & V. R. Co. v. Cleveland S. S. Co., 208 U.S. 316, 52 L. Ed. 508
(1908).
18 Knauth, Landward Extension of Admiralty .urisdiction, 35 CORNL.L L. Q. 1
(1949).
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in the federal courts. 9 Finally, in 1948, eighty-three years after The
Plymouth started the trouble, Congress abrogated the specific rule of
that case. The new statute20 provides:
The admiralty ana maritime jurisdiction of the United States shall extend
to and include all cases of damage or injury, to person or property, caused
by a vessel on navigable water, notwithstanding that such damage or injury
be done or consummated on land.
By the terms of the Act, suit may be in rem against the vessel or in
personam, according to the principles of law and rules of practice ob-
taining in cases where the injury or damage has been done or con-
summated on navigable waters of the United States.
An anomaly in the law of admiralty jurisdiction has thus been re-
moved, though it is thought that, with the statutory exception, locality
is still the generally exclusive test21 of tort jurisdiction. Problems of
fixing the locus of the tort will still arise.22
THE WATERS SUBJECT TO ADmIRALTY JURISDICTION
Reference has already been made herein to the jurisdiction of ad-
miralty over the navigable waters of the United States. But this was
not always the judicial definition of "admiralty waters"; this subject
was the scene of the Supreme Court's greatest struggle in freeing the
American admiralty jurisdiction from the restraining shackles of the
English influence. In England, at the time of our Constitution, the
jurisdiction was limited to the waters of the seas and waters washing
the shores within the ebb and flow of the tide. In its early decisions the
Supreme Court followed the English rule of tide waters jurisdiction,
19 PUBLIC VESSELS ACT, 43 STAT. 1112 (1925), 46 U.S.C. §§ 781-790 (1946) ; SuiTs
Ix ADMIRALTY ACT, 41 STAT. 525 (1920), 46 U.S.C. §§ 741-752 (1946).
2060 STAT. 496, 46 U.S.C. § 740 (Supp. 1948).
21 In personal injury cases, dicta have occasionally crept into Supreme Court opin-
ions, in which the maritime character of the injured person's presence on navigable
waters has been used to bolster the jurisdiction. See Atlantic Transport Co. v.
Imbrovek, 234 U.S. 52, 58 L. Ed. 1208 (1914) ; Chelenfis v. Luckenbach S.S. Co., 247
U.S. 372, 62 L. Ed. 1171 (1918). But cf. Grant Smith-Porter Ship Co. v. Rohde, 257
U.S. 469, 66 L. Ed. 321 (1922) : "The general doctrine that... admiralty jurisdiction
depends .. . in tort matters upon the locality, has been so frequently asserted by this
court that it must now be treated as settled." (McReynolds, J.).
22 In The City of Lincoln, 25 Fed. 835 (D.C. N.Y. 1885), followed in Fireman's
Fund Ins. Co. v. City of Monterey, 6 F. 2d 893 (D.C. Cal. 1925), both of which
involved injury to goods by submersion resulting from collapse of a wharf, the locus
of the tort was held the water and admiralty jurisdiction was sustained. Contra: The
Haxby, 95 Fed. 170 (D.C. Pa., 1899) where, a steamer having run into a pier and
precipitated goods stored thereon into the water, the court held the locus of the tort
to be on land and denied admiralty jurisdiction.
THE EXCLUSIVE ADMIRALTY JURISDICTION
and barred courts of admiralty from cognizance of contracts or torts
relating to or occurring upon our inland waters"
In 1847 the court affirmed the admiralty jurisdiction in a collision on
the Mississippi River, ninety-five miles upriver from New Orleans.2
The locus delicti was found to be within the ebb and flow of the tide,
and thus properly within admiralty jurisdiction, even though also within
the territory of a state (the dissenting justices darkly warned of the
consequences of federal encroachment upon the sovereignty of the
states). And in 1851, in the celebrated case of The Genesee Chief,25
Chief Justice Taney flatly repudiated the English view, as inconsonant
with the peculiar conditions and requirements of this country, with its
great network of inland navigable lakes and rivers. The rule in Eng-
land, he said, was predicated on the fact that the tidal stream was
generally the only navigable stream. He announced the new test of
jurisdiction: navigability of the waters as a highway of interstate or
foreign commerce.
The Genesee Chief extended the admiralty jurisdiction to the Great
Lakes; The Hine v. Trevor" extended it to the navigable rivers of the
country, the court stating that the principles established by The Gene-
see Chief required this result, the jurisdiction resting upon the original
grant of power in the Constitution. Rivers must be not only navigable,
but an actual or potential highway for commerce, interstate or foreign.
In The Daniel Ball, 27 the court stated that rivers are
navigable waters of the United States... when they form in their ordinary
condition by themselves, or by uniting with other rivers, a continued high-
way over which commerce is or may be carried on with other states or
foreign countries in the customary modes in which commerce is conducted
by water.
The commerce involved in any particular case may be wholly intrastate,
so long as the water is navigable for interstate or foreign commerce.28
So long as the waterway meets the twin tests of navigability in fact and
capability of bearing interstate or foreign commerce, it matters not
that it is an artificial waterway and wholly within the geographical
jurisdiction of one state."
23 The Thomas Jefferson, 23 U.S. 428, 6 L. Ed. 358 (1828); The Orleans v.
Phoebus, 36 U.S. 175, 9 L. Ed. 677 (1837).24 Waring v. Clarke, 46 U.S. 441, 12 L. Ed. 226 (1847).
25 53 U.S. 443, 13 L. Ed. 1058 (1851).
28 71 U.S. 555, 18 L. Ed. 451 (1866).
2777 U.S. 557, 563, 19 L. Ed. 999 (1870).
2 8 Ex Parte Boyer, 109 U.S. 629, 27 L. Ed. 1056 (1884).29 Ibid.
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A perusal of the Supreme Court decisions indicates that it requires
but a small craft indeed to successfully navigate a river in order that
the river be navigable water within the admiralty jurisdiction of the
United States." The practitioner in the state of Washington will thus
have little difficulty with this phase of the admiralty jurisdiction;
Puget Sound and most of our rivers will meet the test of waters subject
to admiralty jurisdiction.
WRONGFUL DEATH WITHIN THE ADMIRALTY
By the common law an action for wrongful death did not survive,
and thus it was "a singular fact that by the common law the greatest
injury which one man can inflict on another, the taking of his life, is
without a private remedy."" The maritime law followed the common
law in this respect, and it was definitely settled in The Harrisburg"2
that the general maritime law of this country affords no right of action
for wrongful death.
This does not foreclose courts of admiralty from enforcing a right
of action for wrongful death where created by a general state statute.
Such statutes, as applied to wrongful death occurring on navigable
waters within the territorial waters of a state, are enforced in admiralty
on the ground that they create no new maritime cause of action but
only a "new right and liability,"" and because such state modification
of the maritime law "will not work prejudice to the characteristics of
the general maritime law."2
34
The litigant has a substantial choice of forum in enforcing his claim
under a state statute. He may, by virtue of the saving clause," have a
common law action in the state court, " or federal court on the law side
if the other jurisdictional requisites are met. 7 He may sue in personam
in admiralty," and if the state statute specifically provides a maritime
lien he may enforce this in rem against the offending vessel in ad-
30 See, e.g., The Montello, 87 U.S. 430, 22 L. Ed 391 (1870), holding the Fox
River of Wisconsin navigable even though early traders found portages necessary
even for specially constructed boats; Economy Light & Power Co. v. United States,
256 U.S. 113, 65 L. Ed. 847 (1926).
31 Goodsell v. Hartford & New Haven R. Co., 33 Conn. 51 (1865).
3? 119 U.S. 199, 30 L. Ed. 358 (1866).
38 The City of Norwalk, 55 Fed. 98, 109 (D.C. N.Y., 1893), aff'd, 61 Fed. 364
(C.C.A. 2, 1894).
3' Western Fjuel Co. v. Garcia, 257 U.S. 233, 242, 66 L. Ed. 210 (1921).
35 Originally Sac. 9 of the JUnDcMARY AcT of 1789, now 28 U.S.C. § 1333 (Supp.
1949).
86 Sherlock v. Alling, 93 U.S. 99, 23 L. Ed. 819 (1876).
37 Bloom v. Furness-Withy Co., 293 Fed. 98 (D.C. Cal., 1923).
38 Western Fuel Co. v. Garcia, supra note 34.
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miralty,9 but not otherwise." But if the litigant sues in admiralty, he
is still subject to any defenses to his right of action placed thereon by
the state creating it, including the statute of limitations,41 and-most
important-contributory negligence as a complete bar.'
Where Congress has occupied the field by legislation, the familiar
principle is invoked that such legislation supersedes the state death act
where the Congressional enactment is applicable. This is now true as
to death on the high seas, beyond a marine league from the shore of any
state or territory or dependency of the United States, and not other-
wise within the territorial waters of a state. Prior to 1920 a state
statute could apply to death on such waters, at least where the ship
flew the American flag;4 but state wrongful death statutes have been
superseded on the high seas, since 1920, by the federal Death On The
High Seas Act.4 Likewise, the enactment of the Jones Act in the
same year has withdrawn from the purview of the state statutes actions
by the representatives of seamen against their employers for wrongful
death based on negligence, even though the death occurs on territorial
waters of the state."'
THE PREFERRED SHIP MORTGAGE
Brief mention should be made of the preferred ship mortgage. In
1854 the Supreme Court held in Bogart v. The John Jay that a court
of admiralty was without jurisdiction to foreclose a common law
mortgage on a vessel. No maritime lien was afforded by the mortgage; it
was inferior to all classes of maritime liens, and thus afforded little
security to the lender.
In 1920 Congress passed the Ship Mortgage Act48 as part of the
Merchant Marine Act of 1920." As stated by Professor Robinson,"
"The ship mortgage section recognized that if the United States was to
have a merchant marine other than at public cost, the money lending
interests had to be attracted by more bait. The net result of the legis-
39 The Oregon, 81 Fed. 876 (C.C.A. 9, 1897) ; The Amoy, 27 F. 2d 72, (C.C.A. 4,
1928).
40 The Albert Dumois, 177 U.S. 240, 44 L. Ed. 751 (1900).
41 Western Fuel Co. v. Garcia, supra note 34.42 O'Brien v. Luckenbach S.S. Co., 293 Fed. 170 (C.C.A. 2, 1923).
43 The Hamilton, 207 U.S. 318, 52 L. Ed. 264 (1907).
44 46 U.S.C. §§ 761-768 (1946).
45 46 U.S.C. § 688 (1946).
6 Lindgren v. United States, 281 U.S. 38, 74 L. Ed. 686 (1930).
47 58 U.S. 399, 15 L. Ed. 95 (1854).
48 46 U.S.C. §§ 911-954 (1946).
49 46 U.S.C. § 861 et seq. (1946).5 0 ROBINSON oN AD=IRALTY, p. 442.
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lation was to step up the common law mortgage, give it a maritime
character and assign it a place of preference even among the maritime
securities."
The Act sets out in detail the requirements for obtaining the pre-
ferred status for the mortgage and the method of enforcing it; counsel
should check the statutes carefully when drafting and perfecting a ship
mortgage for a variance may well be fatal. 1 The mortgage is preferred,
in general, to all subsequent 2 liens upon the vessel except liens for tort,
stevedore and crew wages, general average and salvage."3
Jurisdiction to enforce the preferred ship mortgage by libel in rem
against the vessel and/or libel in personam against the mortgagor to
recover the mortgage indebtedness is vested exclusively in the United
States District Courts sitting in admiralty. 4 The mortgagee has no
choice of forum in this maritime action if he seeks for his mortgage
the preferred status granted by the Act.
LIMITATION OF LIABILITY
Of particular interest to the general practitioner are the jurisdic-
tional problems in connection with the shipowner's statutory right of
limitation of liability, for this is one maritime subject he may well
meet. To encourage shipbuilding, the investment of money in ships,
and the employment of ships in commerce,55 Congress enacted the
Limited Liability Act in 1851." By its provisions, the shipowner is not
to be liable for loss or damage occasioned without his "privity or
knowledge'57 beyond the value of his interest in the vessel and her
pending freight at the close of the voyage.5" Pending ascertainment of
liability and his right to limit it, the shipowner may transfer his vessel
51 The Morse Dry Dock & Repair Co. v. The Northern Star, 271 U.S. 552, 70 L.
Ed. 1082 (1926) ; The Bergen, 7 F. 2d 379 (D.C. Cal., 1925).
52 In accord with the common law and state-statutory concept but contrary to the
general maritime scheme of priorities among maritime liens, where the lien arising
latest in time is awarded priority, at least as to liens of the same class. See the discus-
sion in RoBINsoN ON ADMRALTY, pp. 422-434.
53 The priorities are set forth in 46 U.S.C. § 953 (1946).
54 46 U.S.C. §§ 951, 954 (1946).
55 Norwich etc. Co. v. Wright, 80 U.S. 104, 20 L. Ed. 585 (1872) ; Butler v. Boston
etc. S.S. Co., 130 U.S. 527, 32 L. Ed. 1017 (1889).
56 9 STAT. 635 (1851), now 46 U.S.C. §§ 181-189 (1946).
s7 "Privity or knowledge" is construed to mean personal fault, or personal par-
ticipation by the shipowner in the fault or negligence causing the loss. Where the ship-
owner is corporate, the inquiry is into the managerial hierarchy to ascertain whose
fault may properly be attributed to the corporation. Coryell v. Phipps, 317 U.S. 406,
87 L. Ed. 363 (1942).
58 By amendments in 1935 and 1936, in the case of certain defined seagoing vessels,
liability cannot be limited below $60 per gross ton to pay personal injury and death
claimants, even though the vessel be sunk and its value zero. 46 U.S.C. § 183 b (1946).
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to a trustee, or file a stipulation for value in lieu thereof to pay all
claims up to the value of the vessel and pending freight as finally
determined by appraisement under order of the court. Assuming the
shipowner to be liable but entitled to limit, the fund is apportioned
among the interests suffering loss.
The shipowner may raise the defense of limitation of liability either
by way of answer when sued, 9 or by filing a petition in admiralty.
Where there are multiple claims, the form of proceeding by petition in
admiralty results in a concourse of all claims in that one action. Upon
application by the petitioner, the court will issue an order restraining
the prosecution of all other suits, in any forum, against him or his
vessel in respect to any claim subject to limitation in the proceeding."0
Where there are multiple claims the exclusive jurisdiction is in ad-
miralty if the shipowner files a petition, and the admiralty court deter-
mines not only his right to limit but the validity of the claims against
him."1 It is to the shipowner's advantage to have the claims against him
adjudicated in admiralty for that forum generally provides no trial byjury in civil causes.2 The claimant, however, may prefer his remedy
in personam in a common law court with a jury trial. Where there are
multiple claims, the right of limitation can only be effected practicably
by a procedure providing a concourse of all claims in a single proceed-
ing, and the balance is thus in favor of exclusive jurisdiction in the
admiralty forum.
In the single claim case the balance is not so clear. It is established
that merely because the shipowner is sued first in a state court he can-
not be thereby deprived of his right to limit liability.5 The claimant
argued that, there being but one claim and hence no need for a con-
course of claimants in one proceeding, he ought to be able to litigate
his rights in a common law court with a jury trial under the saving
clause. Prior to the decision of the Supreme Court in White v. Island
Transportation Co.,64 the lower federal courts were in disagreement as
59 In which case no transfer of the vessel to a trustee or filing of a stipulation for
the value of the shipowner's interest is necessary. The Great Western, 118 U.S. 520,
30 L. Ed. 156 (1885).
60 The procedure is set out in SuPRamm CouRT ADmIRALTY RULES 51-54.
61 Hartford Accident & Indemnity Co. v. Southern Pacific Co., 273 U.S. 207, 71
L. Ed. 612 (1927).62 See 2 BEEmicT ON ADmLA&LTY 32, 33, § 224 (6th ed. 1940). A limited statutory
exception is provided in certain cases arising on the Great Lakes, by 28 U.S.C. § 1873
(Supp. 1948).
63 Carlisle Packing Co. v. Sandanger, 259 U.S. 255, 66 L. Ed. 927 (1922), holding
that the shipowner could obtain the advantages of limitation of liability by proper
pleading in a state court action against him.
84233 U.S. 346, 58 L. Ed. 993 (1914).
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to whether state courts had jurisdiction to grant limitation of liability,
and whether admiralty had such jurisdiction to do so and restrain a
prior state suit where there was but a single claim."5 In the White case
the court held that an admiralty court had jurisdiction to entertain a
petition for limitation of liability and restrain a prior state suit against
the vessel owner even though there was but a single claim.
The White case did not settle the matter, however, and it was not
till the Aloha cases reached the court from the Western District of
Washington that further light was shed on the comparative rights be-
tween the shipowner and claimant as to their choice of forum in the
single claim case. In Langnes v. Green"6 Green sued Langnes in the
Superior Court of Washington for personal injuries received aboard
the latter's vessel Aloha. Langnes then petitioned in admiralty for
limitation of liability, which court restrained the prosecution of the
state court suit and refused to dissolve the injunction on motion of
Green, his being the only claim filed. This, said the Supreme Court, was
an abuse of discretion; the District Court
should have granted respondent's motion to dissolve the restraining order
so as to permit the cause to proceed in the state court, retaining, as a matter
of precaution, the petition for a limitation of liability to be dealt with in the
possible but (since it must be assumed that respondent's motion was not
an idle gesture but was made with full appreciation of the state court's
entire lack of admiralty jurisdiction) unlikely event that the right of peti-
tioner to a limited liability might be brought into question in the state court,
or the case otherwise assume such form in that court as to bring it within
the exclusive power of a court of admiralty.67
Undaunted by the Supreme Court's language, Green, following re-
mission of the case to the state court, "brought into question" the right
of Langnes to limitation by challenging the grounds upon which the
right was claimed. The District Court thereupon enjoined the state
court proceeding and was affirmed in Ex Parte Green."8 The court re-
affirmed the doctrine that the right to limitation of liability is cogniz-
able only in a court of admiralty. The result is thus that the litigant is
entitled to have the issues of liability and amount of damages deter-
mined by a jury in a common law action, but not the issue of the ship-
owner's right to limit. The latest decisions of the Court of Appeals for
65 The cases are discussed in the article by McHose, Admiralty Jurisdiction and
Limitation of Liability In Single Claim Cases, 22 CA.iF. L. REv. 526 (1934).66 282 U.S. 531, 75 L. Ed. 520 (1931).
671 Id. at 541, 75 L. Ed.68 286 U.S. 437, 76 L. Ed. 1212 (1932).
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the Second Circuit indicate that the proper procedure is for the claim-
ant to file in the state court proceeding a consent to reserve the issue of
the shipowner's right to limitation of liability to the admiralty court,
whereupon the state court may proceed to adjudicate the issues of
liability and damages. 9
PROCEEDINGS IN REM AND THE SAVING CLAUSE
We now consider a class of action on maritime causes which, by
virtue of its nature, is reserved exclusively to courts of admiralty: the
proceeding in rem. It was because the Washington court thought the
proceeding before it in Cline v. Price" was of this kind that it dis-
missed it for lack of jurisdiction.
With the advent of the steamboat upon the rivers and other inland
waters of the United States in the last century, many of the states
bordering those waters passed lien laws, providing for liens against
vessels for torts, breach of contract of carriage, furnishing of supplies
and repairs, and other matters which furnish the basis for the maritime
lien in admiralty. Such state statutes provided for enforcement of the
liens by direct process against the offending vessel as the defendant,
with no personal proceedings against the owner required-in essential
respects indistinguishable from the historic admiralty procedure in
rem to enforce a maritime lien." So long as the admiralty jurisdiction
was excluded from these inland waters, there was no problem; states
may create any right and remedy to enforce it where admiralty is
without jurisdiction.72 When, however, the decision of the Supreme
Court in The Genesee ChiefJ7 made state and federal jurisdiction under
the admiralty clause of the Constitution concurrent over these inland
waters, the problem became acute. The rights sought to be enforced in
the state courts were maritime in nature. The argument advanced to
69Petition of Red Star Barge Line, Inc., 160.F. 2d 436 (C.C.A. 2, 1947); The
Lavinia D, 190 F. 2d 684 (C.C.A. 2, 1951).
70Supra, note 1.
71 The maritime lien "is a ]as in re, and 'it has been settled so long, that we know
not its beginning, that a suit in the admiralty to enforce and execute a lien, is not an
action against any particular person to compel him to do or forbear anything but a
claim against all mankind; a suit in rem, asserting the claim of the libelant to the
thing, as against all the world.' The Young Mechanic, 2 Curt. 404, 412." Fuller, C. J,
in Moran v. Sturges, 154 U.S. 256, 282, 38 L. Ed. 981, 990 (1894). The American
concept of the lien is that of a proprietary interest in the offending res, arising con-
temporaneously with the cause of action. See Hough, Admiralty Jurisdiction of Late
Years, 37 HAxv. L. Rzy. 529, 541 (1924).
7 2 Hence, a state statute affording a lien to a shipbuilder and providing a remedy
in rem against the ship enforcible in the courts of the state is valid as not in contra-
vention of the admiralty jurisdiction. Knapp, Stout & Co. v. McCaffrey, 177 U.S. 638,
44 L. Ed. 921 (1900).
73 Supra, note 28.
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uphold the state acts was that they merely provided a concurrent com-
mon law remedy which was expressly saved to suitors by the ninth
section of the Judiciary Act of 1789, which granted exclusive original
cognizance to the federal district courts of all civil causes of admiralty
and maritime jurisdiction, "saving to suitors, in all cases, the right of
a common law remedy where the common law is competent to give it." '
In a series of cases commencing in 1867, the Supreme Court de-
lineated the scope of the saving clause as related to the exclusiveness of
admiralty jurisdiction. The net effect of these cases is this: the saving
clause gives to the states concurrent jurisdiction with admiralty over
actions in personam or quasi in rem; admiralty has exclusive jurisdic-
tion over proceedings in rem against a vessel to foreclose a maritime
lien; and state statutes which create a maritime lien on a vessel with
proceedings in state courts directly against the vessel to enforce it,
essentially akin to the admiralty in rem proceeding, are to the latter
extent invalid.
The foundation case is The Moses Taylor, 7  denying to the state
courts of California jurisdiction to foreclose a lien for breach of a con-
tract of passenger carriage by proceedings in rem against a vessel.
Justice Field, speaking for the court, said:
The action against the steamer by name, authorized by the Statute of
California, is a proceeding in the nature and with the incidents of a suit in
admiralty. The distinguishing and characteristic feature of such suit is that
the vessel or thing proceeded against is itself seized and impleaded as the
defendant, and is judged and sentenced accordingly. It is this dominion of
the suit in admiralty over the vessel or thing itself which gives to the title,
made under its decree, validity against all the world. By the common law
process, whether of mesne attachment or execution, property is reached
only through a personal defendant, and then only to the extent of his title.
Under a sale, therefore, upon a judgment in a common law proceeding the
title acquired can never be better than that possessed by the personal de-
fendant. It is his title, and not the property itself, which is sold.
The court succinctly defined the scope of the saving clause in the fol-
lowing oft-quoted language:"'
The case before us is not within the saving clause of the 9th section. That
74 With the enactment of the new Judicial Code in 1948, this language was changed
to read, "saving to suitors in all cases all other remedies to which they are otherwise
entitled." 28 U.S.C. § 1333 (Supp. 1948).
7571 U.S. 411, 18 L. Ed. 397 (1867).
76 Defining the proceeding in rem which is within the exclusive jurisdiction of
admiralty, Justice Hughes substantially quoted this language in Rounds v. Cloverport
Foundry & Machine Co., 237 U.S. 303, 59 L. Ed. 966, 968 (1915).
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clause only saves to suitors "the right of a common law remedy, where the
common law is competent to give it." It is not a remedy in the common law
courts which is saved, but a common law remedy. A proceeding in rem, as
used in the admiralty court is not a remedy afforded by the common law;
it is a proceeding under the civil law. When used in the common law courts,
it is given by statute.
Following The Moses Taylor, the Supreme Court held that state
courts were without jurisdiction to enforce, by proceedings in rem
against the vessel, liens for collision, 7 breach of contract of affreight-
ment,78 and furnishing of supplies to a vessel by a materialman.79 State
laws may create liens which admiralty will enforce, but the states are
limited in their enforcement of such liens to common law remedies by
actions in personam, with or without attachment of the vessel to pro-
vide security for the judgment. "The practice may be somewhat
anomalous, but it has existed from the origin of the government."80
Proceedings against a vessel-owner coupled with auxiliary attach-
ment of his vessel to provide security for the plaintiff's claim are within
the competency of the state courts to entertain. So are similar actions
quasi-in-rem against a non-resident defendant, where attachment of his
vessel establishes the jurisdiction of the court as well as furnishes
security to the plaintiff. Such proceedings are well known to the com-
mon law. This was early held in Taylor v. Carryll' and the proposition
has been repeated in numerous cases since.s"
The Supreme Court summarized the holdings of the prior cases in
Knapp, Stout & Co. v. McCaffrey"8 as follows:
The true distinction between such proceedings as are and such as are not
invasions of the exclusive admiralty jurisdiction is this: If the cause of
action be one cognizable in admiralty, and the suit be in rem against the
thing itself, though a monition be also issued to the owner, the proceeding
is essentially one in admiralty. If, upon the other hand, the cause of action
be not one of which a court of admiralty has jurisdiction, or if the suit be
in personam against an individual defendant, with an auxiliary attachment
against a particular thing, or against the property of the defendant in gen-
eral, it is essentially a proceeding according to the course of the common
77 The Hine v. Trevor, 71 U.S. 555, 18 L. Ed. 451 (1867).
78 The Belfast, 74 U.S. 624, 19 L. Ed. 266 (1869).
79 The Glide, 167 U.S. 606, 42 L. Ed. 296 (1897).
so Mr. Justice Bradley in The Lottawanna, 88 U.S. 558, 580, 22 L. Ed. 654, 663(1875).(161 U.S. 583, 15 L. Ed. 1028 (1857).
8 2 See, e.g., Leon v. Galceran, 78 U.S. 185, 20 L. Ed. 74 (1870) ; Knapp, Stout &
Co. v. McCaffrey, 177 U.S. 638, 44 L. Ed. 921 (1900), holding that a state court of
equity had jurisdiction to foreclose a possessory lien on a raft of logs for towage--"the
suit was clearly one it; personam to enforce a common law remedy."$8 Ibid.
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law, and within the saving clause of the statute (§ 563) of a common law
remedy.
The Washington court in Cline v. Price predicated its holding that
the lower court had no jurisdiction of the partition action upon the
following syllogism: Admiralty has exclusive jurisdiction over action
in rem, a suit for partition is essentially a proceeding in rem, therefore
a state court is without jurisdiction of a suit for partition of a vessel.
The validity of the minor premise is open to some doubt, and that of
the major premise even more so if it is applied uncritically.
The court relied upon Dennis v. Godfrey" for its characterization
of an action for partition as one in rem, having said in that case, where
one of the owners of the land involved was a non-resident who had not
been personally served, "The proceeding was one strictly in rem. No
personal judgment was sought or could have been obtained." But this
is the sort of action which, the court's jurisdiction depending on attach-
ment of the non-resident's property within the state, the United States
Supreme Court has characterized quasi-in-rem as distinguished from
the true in rem action as used in the admiralty. It was so held in an
action involving partition of land in Freeman v. Alderson," where
Justice Field said:
Actions in rem, strictly considered, are proceedings against property alone,
treated as responsible for the claims asserted by the libelants or plaintiffs.
The property itself is in such actions the defendant, and . .. its forfeiture
or sale is sought for the wrong, in the commission of which it has been the
instrument, or for debts or obligations for which by operation of law it is
liable. The court acquires jurisdiction over the property in such cases by its
seizure, and of the subsequent proceedings by public citation to the world,
of which the owner is at liberty to avail himself by appearing as a claimant
in the case. There is, however, a large class of cases which are not strictly
actions in rem, but are frequently spoken of as actions quasi-in-rem, because,
though brought against persons, they only seek to subject certain property of
those persons to the discharge of the claims asserted.
Referring to the action of partition in the case before him, he stated:
Such action, though dealing entirely with the realty, is not an action in rem
in the strict sense of the term; it is an action against the parties named, and,
though the recovery and partition of real estate are sought, that does not
change its character as a personal action; the judgment therein binds only
the parties in their relation to the property. 8
It is suggested that the court erred in characterizing the suit for
84 122 Wash. 207, 210 Pac. 507 (1922).
85 119 U.S. 185, 30 L. Ed. 372, 373 (1886).
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partition as a proceeding in rem in Cline v. Price. But it is not enough
to deduce the answer by the process of labeling alone. Even if partition
be in rem, it does not necessarily follow that admiralty has exclusive
jurisdiction. The ultimate question in a given case is whether there was
a common law remedy;"7 by way of illustration, a suit strictly in rem
against a vessel to enforce a forfeiture for violation of municipal law
was a proceeding known to the common law and thus saved to the
states by virtue of the saving clause.88
It is submitted that when the Supreme Court has said that actions
in rem are within the exclusive jurisdiction of admiralty and not within
the saving clause, it was talking solely about in rem actions, in the strict
sense of the term, against a vessel to foreclose a maritime lien. The
court has never denied state court jurisdiction in any other kind of case,
and the language of the cases, so far as suits between private litigants
are concerned, is restricted in this connection to actions in rem to en-
force a maritime lien.8" That the proceeding in rem which admiralty
jealously guards is tied to the maritime lien, seems apparent from the
language of Justice Field in The Rock Island Bridge,90 where, referring
to the maritime lien, he said:
The only object of the proceeding in rem, is to make this right, where it
exists, available ... to carry it into effect. It subserves no other purpose.
The lien and the proceeding in rem are, therefore, correlative... where one
exists, the other can be taken, and not otherwise.
The court quoted with approval from the English decision of The Bold
Buccleugh:°1 "in all cases where a proceeding in rem is the proper
course, there a maritime lien exists, which gives a privilege or claim
SId. at 30 L. Ed. 384. In Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 185, 24 L. Ed. 565, 573 (1878),
Justice Field classified actions to partition real estate, foreclose a mortgage or enforce
a lien as actions in rem in the larger sense of the word as distinguished from such
actions in the strict sense of the term, meaning proceedings taken directly against the
property.
871n Fisher v. Carey, 173 Cal. 185, 159 Pac. 577, LRA 1917A 1100, it was sug-
gested that an action to partition personal property was a remedy known solely to
equity and thus not saved to the suitor by the saving clause. If true, this objection,
should be obviated by the change in the language of the saving clause when it was
reenacted as 28 U.S.C. § 1333 in the 1948 revision of the Judicial Code. The purpose
of the change, according to the revisers' notes, was to reflect the abolition of the dis-
tinction between law and equity (RULE 2, F.R.C.P.) and be more expressive of the
original intent of Congress.
88 Cf. C. J. Hendry Co. v. Moore, 318 U.S. 133, 87 L. Ed. 663 (1943), upholding
forfeiture proceedings in the California state courts against a purse net used in fishing
in violation of the State Fish and Game Code.89 See, in addition to the cases previously cited herein, American Steamboat Co.
v. Chace, 83 U.S. 522, 21 L. Ed. 369 (1873) ; Moran v. Sturges, 154 U.S. 256, 38 L.Ed. 981 (1894).9073 U.S. 213, 18 L. Ed. 753, 754 (1867).
917 Moore, P. C., 284.
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upon the thing to be carried into effect by legal process. ' '92
The suit for partition was not one in which the vessel was "itself
seized and impleaded as the defendant, [to be] judged and sentenced
accordingly.""3 In Knapp, Stout & Co. v. McCaffrey,94 a state court
equity suit to foreclose a possessory lien on a raft of logs for towage,
the Supreme Court held it incumbent on the defendant, who pleaded
jurisdiction exclusively in admiralty, to show that the proceeding taken
was a suit in rem as construed in The Moses Taylor," The Hine v.
Trevor," The Belfast," and The Glide9 -all cases involving a suit
directly against the vessel to appropriate her, as the offending res, for
the indemnification of the plaintiff. The action before it, said the court,
was "no more a suit in rem than the ordinary foreclosure of a mort-
gage." Since the same court in Pennoyer v. Neff99 and Freeman v.
Alderson'00 linked actions to foreclose a mortgage and actions for par-
tition as actions in rem only in the broad (or quasi) sense of the term,
as distinguished from the true action in rem as defined in the admiralty
cases, it should seem that the action for partition of a vessel in a state
court is a remedy to which the suitor "is otherwise entitled,"'01 as not
infringing upon the exclusive jurisdiction of admiralty.
The Washington court in Cline v. Price could-and it is submitted,
should-have taken jurisdiction over plaintiff's lawsuit. The ultimate
result of denying plaintiffs the relief sought may well be correct. As
pointed out in the Cline case, as a matter of substantive law admiralty
will not decree a partition of a vessel at the behest of minority owners
who object to the employment to which the vessel is put by the ma-
jority."0 2 As a matter of uniformity in the maritime law, binding upon
both state and federal forums,0 3 a state court should doubtless apply
this rule.'04 But this is a matter of substantive law, not jurisdiction.
Cline v. Price has not clarified the scope of jurisdiction in the admiralty.
92 At 18 L. Ed. p. 755.
93 Justice Field in The Moses Taylor, supra, note 75.
94 Supra, note 82.
95 Supra, note 75.
96 Supra, note 77.
97 Supra, note 78.98 Supra, note 79.
9 Supra, note 86.
100 Supra, note 85.
201 The present language of the saving clause, 28 U.S.C. § 1333 (Supp. 1948).
102 1 Benedict, op. cit., 158 § 74.
10 See The Lottawanna, supra, note 80, and the discussion of the federal cases in
Cline v. Price, 39 Wn. 2d 822, 823, 239 P. 2d 322 (1951).
1 o It might avoid this by holding the matter to be "local" in nature and within
the "maritime but local" exception to the doctrine of uniformity. See Robinson, op. cit.,
p. 101 et seq.
